Deborah Puchakjian v. Township of Winslow by unknown
2013 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
4-11-2013 
Deborah Puchakjian v. Township of Winslow 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2013 
Recommended Citation 
"Deborah Puchakjian v. Township of Winslow" (2013). 2013 Decisions. 996. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2013/996 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2013 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 11-2974 
____________ 
 
DEBORAH PUCHAKJIAN, 
 
Appellant 
 
v. 
TOWNSHIP OF WINSLOW 
 
_____________ 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civil No. 1:09-cv-01326) 
District Judge: Honorable Noel L. Hillman 
____________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
April 13, 2012 
 
Before:  McKEE, Chief Judge, HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge 
and JONES, II,
*
 District Judge. 
 
(Opinion Filed:  April 11, 2013) 
____________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
                                               
 *
The Honorable C. Darnell Jones, II, District Judge for the United States District 
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation. 
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Jones, II, District Judge. 
 
In early 2002, Appellant Deborah Puchakjian was appointed by Appellee 
Township of Winslow (“Township”) to fill a vacancy as the Township‟s Municipal Clerk 
due to the retirement of the incumbent officeholder.  At that time, Puchakjian was 
assigned a significantly lower salary than had been paid to her male predecessor at the 
time of his retirement.  Puchakjian appeals the District Court‟s grant of summary 
judgment in favor of the Township on her wage disparity claims under the federal Equal 
Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206, et seq. (“EPA”), the New Jersey Equal Pay Act, N.J. Stat. Ann. 
34:11-56:2 (“NJEPA”), and the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination, N.J. Stat. Ann. 
10:5-12(a) (“NJLAD”).1  For the reasons that follow, we affirm the District Court‟s 
ruling.
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I. BACKGROUND 
                                               
 
1
 Appellant also asserted a state law claim for violation of a Township ordinance, 
and a retaliation claim under the NJLAD.  She has waived those claims on appeal.  (See 
Br. of Appellant at 3 n.2.) 
 
 
2
 The District Court had jurisdiction of the EPA claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 
1331, and exercised supplemental jurisdiction over the state law NJEPA and NJLAD 
claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367.  This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  
Our review in the summary judgment context is plenary.  Thus, “we are required to apply 
the same test that the district court should have utilized initially.”  Jackson v. Danberg, 
594 F.3d 210, 215 (3d Cir. 2010) (quotation marks and citation omitted).  Summary 
judgment is appropriate only when there are no genuine issues of material fact, drawing 
all justifiable inferences in favor of the non-movant, and the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law.  Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48, 255 
(1986). 
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 We write principally for the benefit of the parties and recite only the essential facts 
and procedural history.  At the time of his retirement after twenty-nine years of service, 
Puchakjian‟s predecessor, Ronald C. Nunnenkamp earned a salary of $85,515 for his 
work as Municipal Clerk.
3
  At the time she replaced Nunnenkamp in 2002, Puchakjian 
received a starting salary of $55,000.
4
  The size of Nunnenkamp‟s final salary was a 
function of his longevity of service, since he was entitled to yearly salary increases that, 
under a New Jersey statute, mandated that municipal clerks receive the same increases in 
salary “given to all other municipal officers and employees.”5   
 The Township sought summary judgment on its affirmative defense that the 
difference in salary paid to Nunnenkamp and Puchakjian was based on a factor other than 
gender, which is one of the four affirmative defenses available to an employer under the 
                                               
 
3
 Nunnenkamp had also been separately appointed the Township‟s part-time 
Business Manager in 1986, and received an additional salary of $13,435 for this service.  
(JA 141.)  Upon his retirement, the Township severed the Municipal Clerk/part-time 
Business Administrator‟s position into separate Municipal Clerk and full-time Township 
Administrator positions.  (JA 97, 156.) 
 
 
4
 It is undisputed that in 2004 the Township retroactively increased Puchakjian‟s 
salary by more than 14.5% to $63,000 because it recognized that a significant gap in 
compensation existed between “traditional male positions of employment and female 
positions of employment.”  (JA 199.)  In addition to this increase, Puchakjian has, along 
with the other Township department heads, received annual increases and she makes no 
claim that those annual increases have been applied in a discriminatory fashion.  (JA 169-
70.)   
 
 
5
 See N.J. Stat. Ann. 40A:9-165 (stating that, for salaries fixed or determined by 
municipal ordinance, “[n]o such ordinance shall reduce the salary of, or deny without 
good cause an increase in salary given to all other municipal officers and employees to, 
any tax assessor, chief financial officer, tax collector or municipal clerk during the term 
for which he shall have been appointed”). 
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EPA.
6
  See 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (providing affirmative defenses for disparities based 
upon: (1) a bona fide seniority system, (2) a merit system, (3) a system which measures 
earnings by quantity or quality of production, or (4) any factor other than gender).  The 
District Court found that there were no genuine issues of material fact that the difference 
in compensation was “reflective of [Nunnenkamp‟s] long tenure as Municipal Clerk” and 
that the yearly salary increases he received over his twenty-nine year tenure in the 
position “both explained and motivated the wage disparity.”  (JA 17-18.)  Accordingly, it 
determined that the wage disparity was based on a factor other than gender.  As 
Puchakjian failed to show that this affirmative defense was a pretext for gender 
discrimination, the District Court granted summary judgment for the Township on this 
EPA claim.
7
  Summary judgment was also granted for the Township on Puchakjian‟s 
                                               
 
6
 The Township also argued that Puchakjian had failed to state a prima facie case 
under the EPA because it was undisputed that Nunnenkamp‟s duties were different from 
her own since he also served as the Township‟s part-time Business Administrator.  The 
District Court rejected this argument, holding that since the two positions were separately 
compensated, it could not conclude that the extra tasks Nunnenkamp performed as 
Business Administrator constituted additional tasks that made his work as Municipal 
Clerk substantially different from Puchakjian‟s work as Municipal Clerk.  (JA 14.)  The 
District Court went on to conclude that because Nunnenkamp‟s salary increases were 
statutorily mandated, his Municipal Clerk salary could not have been a function of his 
additional responsibilities as Business Adminstrator.  Thus, it concluded that Puchakjian 
had established a prima facie case of unequal pay since the two performed substantially 
the same work as Municipal Clerk but were differently compensated.  (JA 16.)  This 
finding has not been appealed by the Township. 
 
 
7
 As the Township successfully established it was entitled to summary judgment 
on its affirmative defense to the EPA claim based on the Nunnenkamp wage disparity, 
the District Court concluded that the Township was also entitled to summary judgment 
on Puchakjian‟s NJLAD claim based upon the wage disparity with Nunnenkamp since a 
defendant‟s burden of enunciating a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for a wage 
5 
 
EPA claim based upon her wage disparity compared with male department heads.  The 
District Court determined that Puchakjian had failed to make out a prima facie case of 
unequal pay because she conceded that her job was not substantially equal to her 
comparators.
8
  (JA 19-21.)  This appeal followed. 
II. DISCUSSION 
 The District Court did not err in granting summary judgment on the Township‟s 
affirmative defense that the difference in pay between Nunnenkamp‟s final salary and 
Puchakjian‟s adjusted starting salary was based on a factor other than gender.  “The 
Equal Pay Act prohibits differential pay for men and women when performing equal 
work „except where such payment is made pursuant to‟ one of the four affirmative 
defenses [listed in § 206(d)(1)].”  Stanziale v. Jargowsky, 200 F.3d 101, 108 (3d Cir. 
2000) (citation omitted).  The EPA contemplates that an employee of one gender with 
significant years of service may receive a higher wage than an employee of the other 
gender with fewer years of service.  See Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 
204 (1974) (stating the “Act contemplates that a male night worker may receive a higher 
wage than a female day worker, just as it contemplates that a male employee with 20 
                                                                                                                                                       
disparity under NJLAD is lower than its burden of proving the affirmative defense to the 
EPA claim.  (JA 23.) 
 
 
8
 On this NJLAD claim, the District Court determined alternatively that, even if 
she could make out a prima facie case based on the claim that the position of Municipal 
Tax Assessor was similar to Puchakjian‟s position as Municipal Clerk, she failed to 
demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact that the wage disparity was based on gender, 
concluding that the disparity was reflective of the yearly, statutorily mandated raises the 
Assessor received during his thirty-eight year length of service.  (JA 28-30.) 
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years‟ seniority can receive a higher wage than a woman with two years‟ seniority[.]  
Factors such as these play a role under [two of] the Act‟s four exceptions — the seniority 
differential under the specific seniority exception, the shift differential under the catch-all 
exception for differentials „based on any other factor other than sex.‟”).  The record 
amply supports the District Court‟s conclusion that there was no genuine issue of 
material fact that Nunnenkamp‟s final salary was a result of the yearly, statutorily 
mandated raises he received during his long tenure in office, and that Puchakjian lacked 
the same tenure.
 9
  There was also no error in its conclusion that she failed to meet her 
burden to come forward with evidence showing that this explanation for the disparity in 
their salaries was a pretext for discrimination.
10
  Accordingly, the District Court did not 
err in granting summary judgment to the Township on its affirmative defense to the EPA 
claim based upon the wage disparity between Puchakjian and Nunnenkamp.  Having 
                                               
 
9
 Puchakjian argues that the District Court erred in concluding that the statutorily 
mandated yearly salary increases satisfied § 206(d)(1)‟s definition of a bona fide seniority 
system.  We need not reach this issue since the District Court‟s alternative finding, that 
the yearly salary increases Nunnenkamp received over his twenty-nine year tenure in the 
position “both explained and motivated the wage disparity,” clearly qualifies as a factor 
other than gender. 
 
 
10
 Puchakjian‟s argument that District Court misstated the burden of proof and 
production scheme governing EPA claims lacks merit.  The District Court correctly 
recognized that, once she established her prima facie case of wage disparity, the 
Township bore the burden of persuasion to demonstrate its affirmative defense that the 
wage disparity was based on a factor other than gender.  See JA 11 (stating that once a 
plaintiff “establishes her prima facie case, „[t]he burden of persuasion then shifts to the 
employer to demonstrate the applicability of one of the four affirmative defenses 
specified in the Act.‟” (quoting Stanziale, 200 F.3d at 107).  The District Court also 
correctly recognized our admonition that, when compared to the employer‟s burden of 
production under Title VII, its burden to prove its affirmative defense under EPA is 
“heightened.”  Id. (citing Stanziale, 200 F.3d at 107-08). 
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correctly determined that the Township was entitled to summary judgment under the 
heightened standard applicable to the Township‟s affirmative defense on the EPA claim, 
there was also no error in the District Court granting summary judgment to the Township 
on the NJLAD claim based on the same conduct. 
III. CONCLUSION 
 For these reasons, we affirm. 
 
